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ADDR ESSES
-

delivered at the

DEDICATION OF THE LAWYERS' CLUB
of the
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

ANN ARBOR
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
MCMXXVI

FOREWOR D
April �5, 19��. Mr. William W. Cook,
a graduate of the College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts of the University
of Michigan in 1880 and of the Law
in 188�, wrote to the Regents of the
Umversity an offer to erect for the University, at
his own expense, "a law students' combined club
and dormitory building." In the letter it was stated
that "All dues and all profit from the operation of
the building shall be used exclusively for legal
research work."
The gift having been accepted, a strikingly
beautiful group of buildings with sleeping rooms and
studies for 160 studen.ts, dining facilities for 300, a
large common living room and comfortable quar
ters for visiting members, was completed in the
early fall of 19�4.
These buildings were dedicated to their purpose
on June 13, 19�5.
Dean Alfred H. Lloyd, then
acting president of the University, presided. The
donor was represented by a close friend, Mr. John
T. Creighton, counsel for the Trust Department of
the National City Bank, New York. The response
to Mr. Cook's letter, as read by Mr. Creighton, was
made for the Law School by Dean Henry M. Bates.
Addresses were made by Dean James P. Hall, of the
University of Chicago Law School, l\1r. John M.
Zane, a graduate of the College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts in 1884, LL. D. 1914, an
active member of the Chicago Bar, and Dean
Roscoe Pound, of the Harvard Law School. To
preserve Mr. Cook's letter and these addresses this
volume has been compiled.

•

INTRODUCTION
By JoHN T. CREIGHTON

HIS cordial reception is indeed gratifying,
and I thank you, both on my own
behalf and on behalf of the gentleman
whom I am here to represent. As an
alumnus of your Law School, nothing could give me
greater pleasure than to take part in this dedica
tion. As the representative of him who made this
dedication possible, I feel that I have been accorded
the highest honor of the day.
It has been my privilege to watch the growth of
the Lawyers' Club from a brain-child to its present
state of maturity.
The idea had already been
conceived, but I haye seen its evolution.
The
amount of forethought and consideration expended
in its development was a source of ever increasing
astonishment to me. No mother could lavish more
care upon her :first-born than was given this under
taking. And now we see it, full grown, a living
actuality-taking its place as a pioneer in a new
realm of legal progress.
What is the purpose behind this work? You
may be sure that it is something more than the
pleasure of erecting a beautiful building; something
more than the pleasure of giving physical comfort.
Much has been done for the other departments
of learning both from without and from within.
But for the Law School, up to this time, nothing
in a material way has been done from without and
little from within. There are things that should
be done and important results to achieve. Of this
he shall tell you himself through the letter he has
asked me to read you.
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I know you must be equally curious about the
man. I might describe him physically-his height,
weight and general appearance-but that would
not serve your purpose. Nor would a description
of his habits of life, for that would be largely an
account of the daily expenditure of thought and
energy he has put into this great undertaking.
Of his personal history, it is significant that he
was attracted to this Law School by his admiration
for Judge Cooley, who had been his father's
counselor and friend.
Cooley's unchallenged
greatness as a lawyer, jurist, teacher and writer
fired his youthful ambition. The force of Cooley's
character exerted a profound influence upon his
entire life. There seems to be a close connection
between Judge Cooley's wonderful career in the
research of the law and the ideas expressed in the
communication you are about to hear.
There are many things I should like to say about
this man, but he would not permit it. He would be
deeply embarrassed by anything approaching
commendation. But I might venture to make one
comparison that is revealing. You are all familiar
with his book. There is no way he can escape
public commendation for that work. It is the result
of more than two score years of the most painstak
ing effort, effort expended in the light of a long and
rich experience. Genius is the capacity for taking
infinite pains. His boo� is. the result not of spas
modic effort, but of daily care and thought. And
when he began to evolve the Lawyers' Club he
went about it in exactly the same thorough manner
and gave it the best that was in him. It is this type
of effort that produced the Lawyers' Club, and it is
from the fullness of his experience that he outlines
its ideals and its purposes.
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It may all be summed up in this: William W.
Cook's predominant characteristics are an irresis
tible concentration of mind, linked with force of
accomplishment. His great idea once conceived,
these are the attributes which made possible its
successful fruition.
I shall now read you his letter:
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ALETTER TO THE LAWYERS, CLUB
BELIEVE there can be no higher public
service in this country than to aid in the
improvement of the law schools. That
leads to the improvement of the Ameriand that means the preservation and
can
improvement of American institutions. The bar
always has been and still is the leader of the people.
In fact, a democracy always trusts the lawyer.
Now, the improvement to my mind of the law
schools can be brought about only by raising the
standards of admission, scholarship and character;
especially character, and by that I mean strong
personality with intelligence and principle. How
can this be done at the University of Michigan?
First, by high qualifications for admission. The
Regents have recently raised them and might well
raise them still higher. All I can do is to help to
attract enough applicants to allow elimination and
selection, but after all the only reliable attraction is
the character of your law school itself. I would
make admission a privilege and a prize.
Secondly, by the best of surroundings and asso
ciations. This means a club house, which you now
have; a library building; a law building; dormitor
ies, research rooms; the presence of distinguished
jurists, judges, members of the bar and visitors;
able professors. A separate library building will
give quiet, seclusion and the studious atmosphere,
necessary to investigation and research. The next
two dormitories should contain ample quarters,
not only for selected law students from your law
school, but also for judges, jurists and distinguished
guests of the University, and also for selected
literary students who intend to study law. The
5

attendance of practicing attorneys and of judges
still on the bench, and of jurists generally, will in
fluence the law students and raise their standards
and ideals. Judge Cooley was Dean of your law
school when I attended it, and Judge Campbell was
one of his associates. Both were at that time
judges in your Supreme Court. The law students
themselves were a somewhat tumultuous gathering,
but the influence of the character, learning and
dignity of the law faculty taught us more than the
books. However, law students are no longer a mere
aggregation and a law school is now something more
than a mere opportunity to learn. Requirements are
higher and should be made higher and higher still.
I would have a selected body of law students, just as
Oxford and Cambridge have a superior class of
young men. The goal sought is the character of the
law students, to be reflected later in the character
of the bar. When the University graduates law
students unsurpassed anywhere in character and
scholarship, the effect on the bar and the country
will be very great, especially throughout the West.
The Lawyers' Club Building now finished is of no
consequence except to forward that purpose. If I
were wealthy enough I would offer to do for Har
vard, Yale and a law school on the Pacific Coast
that which I propose doing for the law school of the
University ef Michigan, and thereby influencing
other law schools.
Thirdly, the school should be endowed so that
the best professors and jurists may be obtained and
retained and liberally paid. Lecturing can unite
with creative work. Jurists are not plentiful but
the law schools can get them.
I do not think the American people realize the
value and importance of the law schools.
The
6

general impression is that a law school needs only a
library and a few professors and that applicants
should be admitted without much preparation and
that the course should be neither long nor severe
Your own law school is one of the best and yet its
percentage of instructors to students is less than
three, while the percentage in the medical school
is over fifteen, and in the engineering department
ten. The following table is for the present collegiate
year:
Department
Students
Instructors
Per Cent.
15.54
83
534
Medical
10.87
182
Engineering 1674
290
5.02
Literary
5774
14
503
2.78
Law
The public expends hundreds of millions annually
on common schools, high schools, colleges and
universities. This is the American system and has
revolutionized society, but in the higher education
the requirements are unformed, crude and insuffi
cient to winnow the wheat from the chaff. Emerson
writing over fifty years ago on "Education" point
ed out the futility of educating together the quick
and the dead, and yet his warning is not heeded.
Moreover, the overcrowding of the great universi
ties renders it imperative that a more drastic
selection be made. This applies to the law schools,
because the law schools make the lawyers and the
lawyers weave the fabric of our government.
Henry Adams, writing in 1889, said that after the)
failure to impeach Justice Chase of the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1805: "Hencefor
ward the legal profession had its own way in
expounding the principles and expanding the
powers of the central government through the
Judiciary." That was over a hundred years ago
7

and has been verified by our intervening history.
That fact alone is enough to' summon the legal
profession to exclude from its ranks those to whom
the Constitution means nothing, and those who
ave neither character nor principle.
America is still in the making but in the domain
of law is no longer dependent on England. On the
contrary it is working out a jurisprudence of its
own.
Here, too, the law schools must furnish
the men to do the work. Law students will be the
law makers, law expounders and law systematizers
of the future. They should be a finished product
the brightest and the best. Republican institutions
in America have not yet fully demonstrated that
self government is enduring in a vast diversified
country. Macauley wrote in 1857 that the Ameri
can Constitution "is all sail and no anchor."
Already we have taken in sail by strictly limiting
further immigration, especially of those who cannot
understand nor appreciate American institutions.
But still we have industrial menaces which defy the
government. Whether self-government can survive
these dangers remains to be seen. The mission of
America is to demonstrate that a great people can
govern itself. Republican institutions are still on
trial and it is for the law schools to marshal the
forces and train the recruits.
Our government
always has been and will continue to be a govern
ment by the legal profession.
The American people have largely broken away
from old forms of religion and are evolving a
religion of character-the worship and practice of
high ideals. It is based on intellect and culture, and
is more than those. It is principle carried into
practice and example. The greatness of a people
consists, not altogether in its laws, art, science,
8

literature, religion, philosophy, inventions, wealth
or power, nor in its great men alone, but in the
average character of its citizens. Raise this and
you raise the nation.
Now nowhere do people
search for and rally quicker under reliable leader
ship than in America. A strong and trustworthy
character is no sooner found than trusted. This is
true worship-worship of the American kind. It
has been called an "intellectual aristocracy." That
is well, so far as it goes, but it omits as an equal
factor, the devotion of that aristocracy to princi
ple. Applying all this to the legal profession, it is
true that the profession is "intellectual" and to a
certain extent it is an "aristocracy," based not on
birth or titles or wealth or social position, but
recruited afresh each year from the people. "The
law is no profession for the stupid, the indolent or
the ignorant." In Emerson's forceful language,
it is "a profession which never admits a fool." Its
successes are earned and its activities many-sided.
It leads into all other occupations; no other occupa
tions lead into it. There are few who tread its hot
and dusty highway from end to end, but those
few mould public opinion instead of following it.
But as an "intellectual aristocracy," it has not
always led the way towards higher standards of
life. It is competent to do so and hence I do not
think I exaggerate when I say that the law schools
are of supreme importance in this respect to the
future institutions, beliefs and conduct of life in
America.
The power of the American Bar is
unorganized and unseen, but upon it depends the
continuity of constitutional government and the
perpetuity of the republic itself.
Another thing. There is an imperative demand
that the legal profession do something to condense,
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simplify, clarify and develop the law. I am not one
of those who bemoan the multiplicity of American
decisions and statutes. From the chaos there is
evolving a new jurisprudence, with the courts and
legislatures of forty-eight states and of the federal
government experimenting on a vast scale. The
time has come, however, to formulate and consoli
date the law. This will have to be done for the most
part at the law schools by jurists and law professors.
It requires leisure to study; time to think and write.
This involves expense and that expense is provided
for by this Lawyers' Club, where all profits and
dues are to be used for that purpose and that pur
pose alone. The success of the plan, however, will
depend on the wisdom with which that fund is
administered.
If real jurists are obtained and
retained from the bench, the bar, and law pro
fessors, we shall be far on the road towards making
the law clear, concise and understandable. The
Encyclopedia Britannica in describing the charac
teristics of a great university names six, the last
being as follows:
"6
. Publication is one of the duties of a pro
fessor. He owes it not only to his reputation but
also to his science, to his colleagues, to the public,
to put together and set forth, for the information
and criticism of the world, the results of his in
quiries, discoveries, reflections and investigations."
The whole plan now has a start in your Lawyers'
Club Building. That provides a nucleus and a
substantial income. By persistent and intelligent
effort the work should move forward; first, to
attract to the University jurists and those capable
of writing law; secondly, to insist on creative work
in condensing, simplifying and clarifying the law.
The American Law Institute, organized in 1923, is
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engaged in that work and has an appropriation for
ten years from the Carnegie Foundation. That
does not prevent the University of Michigan pur
suing the same objects independently, and pursuing
them not for ten years only but indefinitely. If
the American Law Institute can get the proper men
to do such difficult, yet important and high-class
work, the University of Michigan can obtain them
also by paying the price. This is a difficult but
rich field. The road is wide and open to all. In
constructive legal work no one is in the lead. Judge
Cooley of your law school showed what can be
done. The legal needs today are different from the
legal needs in his time, but the public demand that
the legal profession justify its existence is a trumpet
call to every law student who is true to his pro
fession.
Can your law school be made a great centre of
legal education and of jurisprudence for the good
of the public? I believe it can and in that belief
shall press on.
Yours very truly,
(Signed) William W. Cook.

•
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THE NEEDS OF A LAW SCHOOL
By HENRY M. BATES
tiEiiiiilill WIDE and remarkable experience, sound
judgment, fine legal scholarship, and great
intellectual ability have combined to make
Mr. Cook's gift and his plan for this School
umque m the annals of legal education. Beautiful and
satisfying as are the buildings which he has erected,
still more important and still more likely to produce
good results for law and the administration of justice,
is the plan into which he has put so much thought.
Perhaps the outstanding feature of that plan is
the provision which it makes for a large continuing
income, to be devoted exclusively to the purposes
of advanced legal research and publication. This
is not the time to dwell upon the details of that
plan, the outlines of which have been made known
through our publications. Wisely executed, that
plan will be influential in the opening of a new era
in legal education and scholarship. Not only has
the last word not been said as to the objectives of
law schools, but I venture to say we are in the early
stages of their work. The possibilities of researches
in law have scarcely been touched. Only a small
part of the field has been cultivated. The time has
passed when profitable legal research can be con
fined to mere analyzing and restating the various
elements of the law. We no longer think of law as
an end in and of itself, or as a mysterious scheme of
rules super-imposed in some mystical way upon
the human race. We think of law today merely as a
means to an end,-as an instrument with which we
may work for the social welfare of the race. So
considered, law ceases to be merely a set of rules for
12

the guidance of conduct. Rather it is a plan of life,
reaching down into every phase of human existence,
inarticulate itself except as associated with, and
applied to, the life of which it is at once a product
and an influential, if not a controlling factor.
This means that the legal scholar of the future
must study law in all its functional aspects and
must extend his researches into the almost un
limited fields from which the law derives its life and
growth and meaning.
This is no work for children, or for men chiefly
engrossed in other occupations, however closely
they may appear to be related. The teaching and
study of law very definitely have become a part of
university scholarship, which must be pursued in
the broadest and most scientific spirit. To its
service men who would succeed and who would
be really useful must devote their every effort,
in fact, their entire lives. As Secretary of State
Hughes said in Washington, in February, 19�4, the
legal scholar has at last come into his own. The
able and successful at the Bar and upon the bench
are so overwhelmed with the tasks devolving upon
them that they have neither the time nor the
vitality to pursue legal scholarship into its more
distant retreats. As the Secretary said, they are
turning in despair to the law teacher and the legal
scholar, for help. This is no tribute to innate
superiority on the part of the legal scholar. It is
merely a realistic recognition of the fact that legal
scholarship, like practice at the Bar, or like any
other highly developed profession, is the work of
the expert who can command the time and has the
training and the technique of work needed to ex
plore and cultivate the field of law. Specifically,
this must mean, for the law schools, continual
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pressing on along the scholarly lines, which have
characterized the better institutions during the last
few decades, the establishment of genuine and
worth while graduate work in the stronger of these
law schools, the creation of fellowships and scholar
ships, and the study not only of our own legal
system, but of those of other nations and civiliza
tions.
Mr. Cook's great gift promises much for the
future of this School in the prosecution of this work,
so vital to the well being of the human race. His
gift has another noteworthy feature, to which
I have called attention at other times.
We all
believe that the work of the modern law school is
vastly superior to the training in the old Inns of
Court in England and in law offices, in the early
history of America; but we lament the fact that the
contacts of those earlier days between great lawyers
and judges, and neophytes at their studies, have
been almost lost. Mr. Cook's gift and the plan
suggested in his message point to a plan whereby
we may to some extent preserve and unite the
excellences of the old and the newer schemes of
legal education. As these plans mature, we may
fairly anticipate the constant presence of men of
the law who have achieved at the Bar and upon the
Bench; and that their presence and their lectures
and addresses, and their counsel to individual
students and conferences with members of the
faculty, will prove of great benefit.
Again, on behalf of the University and of my
colleagues, let me assure Mr. Cook of our gratitude
for his munificent gift and our deep appreciation of
the care, the interest and the wisdom with which
he has planned its use. It is true, as he has said,
that the permanence and the excellence of Ameri14

can institutions must always depend largely upon
that scheme of law which holds them together and
enables them to function with as little friction and
as little danger as possible. Only through sound
legal scholarship and effective training of the stream
of young men and women coming into the law can
our legal scheme be maintained upon a sound basis.
It is not too much to say, then, that this great gift
and this wise plan of Mr. Cook's will continue, for
generations to come, to contribute splendidly to
the safety, the prosperity and the happiness of
the American people.
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THE NEXT TASK OF THE LAW SCHOOL
By JAMES PARKER HALL
, last December, I first saw these
beautiful buildings, I could only exclaim:
"It is a dream-a wonderful dream come
true!" There was nothing original about
'"'"'"'-.La.JLL.Lation. You have all said or thought the
same thing every time you have approached this
quadrangle. In my mouth this trite but spontan
eous utterance was but part of the res gestae of being
conducted through the group by Dean Bates, the
proud and intimate spirit of this architectural
magnificence. And now, when I am privileged to
return and to share in the dedication to the high
service of man of this miracle of the builder's art,
it still seems to me a dream-realized materially
for the moment in stone and steel and paneled oak,
but even more a symbol and a promise of a fuller
realization yet to come in the lives of men. Happy
he who dreams such dreams as did the giver of
these buildings; happy he who is spared to see his
vision enshrined in the enduring stone that today
we dedicate; but happiest of all he who knows, as
Mr. Cook may do, that from his dream "the best
is yet to come. " And it is to that dream yet unful
filled, to that best that yet may c·ome, that I
�ould devote the part allotted to me in these exer
cises.
There is a new spirit stirring among lawyers
today. A change is taking place in the conception
of the proper function of a university law school.
Until very lately it was conceived almost wholly
as a high-grade professional training school, em
ploying, it was true, scholarly methods and exacting
16

standards of study and achievement, but only
indirectly seeking to improve the substance and
administration of our law. The law, it was assumed,
was what the courts and legislatures made it, and
the task of the law school was to analyze, compre
hend, and classify this product, and to pass on to
students a similar power of analysis, comprehen
sion, and classification, as regards at least the
principal topics of the law, so as to enable them
worthily and successfully to play their parts as
judges and lawyers in the lists of future litigation.
Nor was this for the time being an inadequate or
unworthy end. An immense amount of ground
breaking work had to be done to escape from
traditional conceptions of legal history, of legal
doctrine, of methods of legal reasoning, and of the
function and end of law itself, which for years
fettered legal scholarship and held it in bondage to
a seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy
of law, ill fitted for an age of conscious experiment
and development. Until there had been trained up
a considerable body of practitioners familiar with
the theories and processes of the newer methods of
legal education, and somewhat emancipated from
the too rigid legal formulae of the past, there was
small opportunity to do much to improve the
content of the common law itself. The discoveries
of physical science may be nearly all placed at the
disposal of mankind, though very few persons have
a clear understanding of their underlying theories.
The successful application of medical science
requires the skilled participation of the medical
profession at large, but all are united in opposition
to disease and injury, and those in responsible
positions, even of a public character, are not chosen
by popular vote.
The law is administered and
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largely made by lawyers and judges in the course
of, and as incidental to, litigation, in which the
lawyers are necessarily partisan and the judges
usually elected by popular vote (to say nothing of
direct primaries). Without a well-trained bar the
resulting product of law cannot be creditable, and
this is why no task of a law school can ever be
more important than that of giving the best possible
legal education to those who will be the practition
ers and judges of the next generation, and also why
it must precede all other tasks.
But the efforts of the past thirty years to improve
legal education in America have been measurably
successful. Over fifty law schools now require at
least two years of college work for admission, and,
by the concurrent action of the Association of
American Law Schools and of the American Bar
Association, a movement has been set on foot that
is likely to secure adequate requirements for public
admission to the bar in most of those states where
professional education is fairly well served. The
battle for fair educational standards for the legal
profession is in the way of being won. The task
that remains is of a different sort.
In almost every branch of our law, the last thirty
years have witnessed a rapidly increasing com
plexity and uncertainty, often accompanied by a
rigidity unresponsive to changing social needs.
The causes have been obvious.
Fifty different
domestic jurisdictions, complex and rapidly chang
ing social conditions, a great volume of litigation,
an ill-trained bar, an elective and often rather
mediocre judiciary, and the Anglo-American sys
tem of law-making by judicial precedent have
resulted in a nation-wide complexity and uncer
tainty about a host of legal doctrines, which
18

occasion constant expense, delay, and irritation in
nearly every legal relationship. Some legal com
plexities are natural, because they correspond to
the complexities of life, and some uncertainties are
inevitable where there exist arguable differences of
opinion about substantial matters of policy; but a
large part of all litigation is due to disputes that
involve no important questions of policy but only a
consideration of conflicting decisions and dicta, or
of conflicting analogies.
Few states have a jurisprudence of their own so
comprehensive and so well-settled that it is seldom
necessary to venture outside the covers of their
own reports and statutes in order to find the law on
any topic. In most states, the judges willingly and
necessarily listen to citations from many other
jurisdictions upon legal questions where there are
gaps in the serried array of their own decisions
which the accidents of litigation have never
chanced to fill. And in the west, some of our states
are still too young to have boxed the compass of
legal doctrine even once around within their own
courts. It is inevitable, then, at least as regards
the substantive law and to a lesser extent as re
gards procedure, that the search for the law of a
single state should cover an ever-increasing terri
tory and that judicial borrowings by one state from
the decisions of others should be of undiminishing
frequency. This, though sometimes deplored, has
very real advantages. The richer and fuller legal
experience of the older states is placed at the dis
posal of the newer ones, and briefs and decisions
upon novel questions anywhere in the country are
at once made available to all for use in similar
situations.
A state with a wealth of judicial
experience to draw upon, whether its own or that
19

of its neighbors, is much more likely to be able
adequately to consider all phases of a controverted
question than can a state without such assistance.
Everyone knows how much more helpful a few
actual cases are, as a basis for discussion, than the
same amount of abstract argument.
What we
should deplore is not the bulk and variety of our
legal material-that in itself is not an evil and has
some notable advantages-but that today there
often exists no adequate means for its proper
appraisal and utilization.
A case will arise that is obviously not concluded
by authority in its jurisdiction. By the aid of our
present very excellent system of digests and anno
tated cases it is possible for the attorneys, with
reasonable effort, to collect at least nearly all of the
principal authorities in other states that directly
touch the matter. They are often really or appar
ently conflicting, and have to be analyzed, dis
cussed, and evaluated in order to be useful, and, in
cases of any difficulty, this is a task often performed
rather poorly by the average lawyer. To begin
with, he necessarily approaches the question with a
partisan bias-he is naturally more interested in
winning for his client than in improving the law
of the state; secondly, being usually a general
practitioner, he is seldom an expert in the field of
law concerned; and lastly, he can seldom afford
the time necessary for a really careful study of the
matter. And the courts are usually no more favor
ably situated, for, while not partisan like the law
yers, they are seldom specialists and are under
limitations of time even more pressing than are the
counsel who appear before them.
And so it all too frequently happens that the
advantages of richness and variety of judicial
20

material are quite neutralized by the lack of time
and specialized knowledge necessary properly to
work over the quarry and to separate the nuggets
from the dross. If this valuable but unwieldly and
often conflicting mass of decisions could be ex
plored and sifted and set in order by a body of
competent experts in each state, acting along com
mon lines but adapting their work in each state to
its particular needs, there would speedily result a
marked improvement in the content and adminis
tration of our law. What individual lawyers and
courts, in the exigencies of partisan litigation, now
do poorly and haphazardly, could be done expertly
and comprehensively by the faculties of our
university law schools, if they were organized with
this as one of their major objects-and the benefit
to their communities would be very great.
If our states were without agricultural depart
ments, and the task of dealing with the manifold
problems arising in this field were left to the
individual farmer, or to community groups or
voluntary associations of farmers, as was the case
not long ago, it is clear that no such progress in
agriculture would have been possible as has result
ed from public agricultural departments and
experiment stations, where the problems common
to thousands of farms have been patiently and
skillfully investigated and dealt with by experts in
each of the recognized branches of the calling, and
the results made public for the benefit of all. The
state agricultural schools have trained scientific
farmers, men who know how to induce nature to
yield food for man better than did their fathers
but it has also developed agriculture itself by
scientific investigation and research, not as a mere
by-product of the training of farmers, but as an
21

end in itself for the benefit of the farming class and
of the public everywhere, and no one today doubts
the wisdom and utility of this or wishes it otherwise.
The same thing has been done in medicine. Our
leading medical schools today not only train prac
ticing physicians, instructed in the hard-won
knowledge of the past, but they are more and more
becoming centres of medical research as well,
enlarging the boundaries of knowledge for the
future and co-operating with the endowed foun
dations which are chiefly devoted to research. Our
better schools of engineering also conduct research
in the problems of applied science, and would
doubtless have done so far more widely than they
do, were it not that discoveries useful to industry
are generally patented and e>.."J)loited commercially,
and that our major industries maintain magnificent
research laboratories of their own for this purpose.
It is well known how often they are able to use the
discoveries in pure science that are the product
of research in university laboratories under the
direction of university departments of science.
Now, in its essence, law, too, is an applied science,
as are agriculture, and medicine, and engineering,
and industrial chemistry; and its proper compre
hension and beneficial application to the affairs of
men often requires research and the skilled service
of non-partisan experts, just as do agriculture and
medicine and engineering and industrial chemistry;
and this research may most usefully be conducted
by public or quasi-public agencies, for the same
reasons that are potent in agriculture and medicine
-that otherwise it will not be done with the thor
oughness and fairness and skill that the public
need demands.
I will not here enter into a discussion of the
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difference between legal principles and those of
natural science.
It is entirely true that from
certain viewpoints-such as, for instance, their
origin, and sanctions, and immutability-legal
principles can be said only in a metaphorical sense
to resemble those of natural science.
We may
discover the so-called laws of nature, but are power
less to make or change them, while the law of real
property and of corporations is not only made by
custom and courts and legislatures, but may be
altered by the same agencies. The frank admission
of this important difference between human law
and natural science, while fundamental for a cer
tain kind of analysis of the two, in no way affects
the analogy just suggested. In agriculture and in
medicine the principles involved, though unalter
able by man, are so complicated that the public
service of experts is necessary to make them use
fully available to the community. In the case of
law exactly the same situation exists, even though
most or all laws could be altered by the legislature
or even by decisions of the courts. In the absence
of any conscious effort to make such an alteration,
the question is-as in natural science-what is in
fact the existing principle, and this inquiry in the
case of law, as in the case of natural science, is often
one that can be answered only by the research
and experience of experts. It is also true that the
method of discovering a legal principle is not the
same as that of discovering one of natural science.
The method of trial and error in testing the
hypotheses of the investigator is the reliance of
those who question nature, while considerations of
history, custom, precedent, analogy, policy, justice,
and professional tradition play a part in the
determination of legal principles, and call for the
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exercise of a kind of judgment different from that
which successfully conducts laboratory experi
ments. But the point to be insisted upon here is
the need of research and expert judgment of an
appropriate sort in correctly deducing either legal
or scientific principles.
The next task of our better law schools, then,
should be to provide for skilled research in the
principal topics of the law, the development of
capable experts in these fields, and the publication
of the results of such research so as to be readily
available to the profession. In the larger state
university schools, the work will be organized to
serve two different but co-operating purposes: (I)
It will make an intensive study of the law of its own
state for the benefit of the local bench and bar; and
(2) it will make a similar study of appropriate parts
of the law of the whole country-in this co-operat
ing or preparing to co-operate with the American
Law Institute. An effective organization to do
this will require a substantial increase in the present
size of law school faculties, a diminution. in the
hours of teaching, and the deliberate making of
productive legal scholarship a larger end of law
school effort than it is at present. It will involve
the encouragement of true graduate work in law
not merely in the sense of prescribing extra courses
but in the more vital sense of training legal scholars
-and the establishment of seminars in the more
important legal topics or problems. It will involve
larger law libraries and a considerably increased
expenditure for law schools. It will involve wide
spread and harmonious co-operation with the
bench and bar, in order that the social rewards of
such endeavors may be realized to the fullest
extent. And it will involve a certain period of
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faith in the wisdom of the undertaking while await
ing the fruits that cannot be immediately garnered.
Here at Ann Arbor such work may be now
initiated and carried on under an extraordinarily
favorable set of conditions: You have an old and
well-established Law School, for many of its earlier
years without a serious rival in this part of the
country; you have a large and loyal body of
alumni widely distributed throughout the nation;
you are a part of one of our greatest universities,
supported by the resources of a rich, populous, and
progressive state; you are to have (and in part
dedicate today) one of the most beautiful and use
ful groups of buildings devoted to professional
education in the world; you have one of the great
law libraries of America; you have an able and
enthusiastic faculty, most of whom have their best
years yet before them; in Dean Bates you have a
leader, wise, energetic, and persuasive, who is
happily of an age when he, too, may hope to enter
the promised land, instead of merely gazing upon
it from Mt. Pisgah; in the Michigan Law Review,
with its connections with the state bar association,
you have an adequate organ of publicity ready to
your hand; and, from private endowment as well as
public taxation, you are likely to have the resources
necessary to undertake a fitting share in the great
public task of clarifying our law and adapting it
better to the needs of our time.
And so, as we dedicate today the Lawyers' Club,
the initial realization of that beautiful quadrangle
of law whose remaining buildings will soon take
shape, we stand on the threshold of a fine and
worthy adventure for the betterment of our ancient
profession. The temple reared by human hands is
before us. It remains for it to be possessed by the
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spirit of human service for which these cloisters are
a fitting habitation. Into it will be poured the
labors of devoted teachers and scholars, the efforts
of students, the support of alumni, and the
co-operation of the profession; and out of it will
come, in the fullness of time, an influence that will
work mightily for the improvement of our law and
its administration in the state and in the nation.
Its mission will be conceived in no narrow spirit.
It will teach students. It will train scholars. It
will hold up high ideals for the profession. It will
inspire and help other schools to follow its example.
And above all it will labor to simplify and clarify
the law, to fashion it to our changing needs, and to
keep it the flexible instrument of social progress
that is the difficult and crowning achievement of
human institutions. To no purposes less high and
noble can this beautiful gift be dedicated. And,
with the generous and far-sighted giver, it is to the
future that we chiefly look. Those of my own
years, whose voices are heard here today, will be
gone before the full realization of this greater
dream. ·we may do something to point the way,
but on the shoulders of the youth that will yet
pass through these halls must rest the burden of
reaching the goal.
Blessed be youth-plastic,
vivid, fearless-to whom once in every generation a
new heaven and a new earth are possible! Age may
dream, as well as youth, and even more often than
youth may see its dreams arise in battlemented
towers against the sky; but in the world of the
spirit, where ideas are translated into life, those
dreams come true that under their banners can
enlist youth. And because the dream that these
buildings shadow forth is one that must appeal to
youth-to the able, well-trained, hopeful youth
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that will pass here some of their choicest years and
will receive here the indelible impress of this school
-we may well feel that in their hands the ideals of
the giver are safe and will prevail.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
ENDOWMENT
BY JOHN M. ZANE
NGRAVEN over the entrance to this
building are the words "The Character
of the Legal Profession Depends on the
�!!ii�iil Character of the Law Schools. The Char
acter
the Law Schools Forecasts the Future of
America."
Speaking in some sense on behalf of the legal
profession, I can here make a confession and at the
same time a prediction. The confession is a con
fession from one who has passed his life in practice
at the bar; and the prediction is of the same char
acter.
The confession is in regard to what is,
beyond question, the narrowness of the ordinary
practitioner. The prediction is that the influence
of such endowments as this will have a vast in
fluence in correcting the ordinary narrowness of
the profession. It is in that spirit that I speak to
you today, and the idea is this: That the contact
which is brought about between teachers of the law
and practitioners of the law is bound to result in
benefit, but mainly benefit to the practitioners of
the law.
As we look around upon this noble endowment,
we see more than lovely buildings, more than this
embodiment in stone of refined and elevated taste,
more than this Lawyers' Club where practitioners
may enjoy the advantages of research in surround
ings that are an incentive to excellence, more even
than the Law School which will find shelter in these
halls when munificence has completed their full
design. These results are in themselves admirable,
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but behind this fair exterior it seems to me we can
discern the flowering of an idea that will bear fruit
in the development of jurisprudence. It is the con
ception of the constantly recurring necessity of
securing the liberalizing and broadening of pro
fessional outlook and the elevating influence upon
the lawyer in practice, that comes from contact
with those who pass their lives in the teaching of
the law and whose constant, disinterested aim is
the attainment of righteous law. Not much less
does the legal teacher need the correction of the
restraining hand of professional opinion.
Someone has said that the law that is created
by a legal profession is "tough law. " By that is
meant that it is fully tried and enduring law. As
we look back over the history of jurisprudence we
may be certain of the fact that the only systems of
law that have endured are those that have been
created by a fully developed legal profession. The
reason is plain but it is often forgotten. A system
of law that will survive from age to age is a system
that grows by the imperceptible acceptance of its
rules by the great mass of the particular social
community over which that law is to rule. The
only true lawgiver is this practically united sense
of the whole community.
The most absolute
despot that ever lived was powerless to impose a
system of law upon his subjects without their con
sent. Only those written and enacted laws have
been successful and enduring, which have embodied
rules that before enactment had already met the
endorsement of the social organization, and there
fore needed no enactment.
It results that enduring law in a civilized society
has come from the careful scrutiny of legal prin
ciples in litigated cases by adequate tribunals
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manned by a legal profession. There in the con
tact between lawyer on the bench and lawyer at
the bar, who are more than average representatives
of the intelligence of their fellows, has grown the
law, by the winnowing and sifting, the weighing
and application of those principles of right and
duty, which reflect the accepted law of the com
munity and the enduring life and growth of law
have been manifested through the efforts of pro
fessional lawyers, as advocates and judges, work
ing in this sustaining medium of the community's
adoption of law.
Into this judicial officinum juris, if I may use the
term, pass customs, statutes, inherited moral
beliefs, average conceptions of right and wrong, and
even those subconscious habits of mind that rule
men's ideas and lives without any consciousness on
their part, and from this workshop come, some
times only after repeated misapprehensions and
grievous mistakes, the enduring principles that will
live as permanent jurisprudence. But this process
has its dangers. Its greatest evil results from a
constantly working tendency of the human mind.
A precedent is easy to follow even though its appli
cation be a mistake. The great mass of men dislike
the labor of thinking and hence on their brows is
branded the mark of mediocrity. To act is easy but
to think is hard, and the law in the hands of its
practitioners is always tending to become a mere
art, and not a growing science. The judge and the
practitioner constantly prefer to sink to the level
of parrot-like repetition and to become what Cicero
calls a leguleius, praeco actionum, anceps sylla
barum. They are always ready stare supe1· antiquas
vias, while they forget the rest of the saying, which
enjoins, videre quaenam sit via recta et bona et
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ambulare in ea, to look for the good and right way
and to walk only in that way.
If life were static, law and most other rules for
human association would be lasting; but humanity
moves onward. Progress is the law of life and man
develops new needs. New situations create new
duties and alter the old. Law must constantly
meet new demands, not in its fundamentals, it is
true, for the formative influences of social life
remain those age old virtues which must always
condition human existence and association; yet in
its application law must be a progressive science.
Like the river it must flow on forever, but it must
be fed by living springs. A practitioner, who is not
a jurist by nature, cannot supply in full measure
those revivifying influences. He must be brought
under the influence of those who devote their lives
to the theoretical perfecting of the law. These
teachers of the law, in their searching of the history
of principles and of adaptation of them to changing
human conditions, are striving to make the law not
the cold grasp of death laid upon us by the past,
but the touch of a living and healing hand.
Yet here again the jurists, these gallant strivers
for theoretical perfection, are often not sufficiently
alive to the thought of how slow and gradual must
be the process by which changes in the law will
meet general acceptance and how widespread in
collateral matters will be the results of change.
The deepest rooted conviction of men in regard to
law is that it must meet the supreme test of an
impartial rule, in an administration freed from
personal idiosyncrasy, where all men are in truth
and in fact on an equality before the law and its
tribunals. If it be made the subject of frequent
change, law ceases to be what general acceptance
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demands that it shall be. Hence we come back to
the necessary influence of the practicing lawyer,
unbending and opposed to change though he be,
upon the teachers of jurisprudence.
If we look to history it tells us that once and once
only was this reciprocal influence secured. The
Roman patented counsel, jurisconsults or juris
prudentes, were men who had been trained in the
practice and in service as judges. Their words will
live forevermore in the pages of the Roman Digest.
To those patented counsel, no longer in the practice,
the courts referred difficult cases for decision.
From these men came, too, the teachers of the law.
They by their responsa created that enduring
body of law, which survived the ruin of Rome and
the destruction of the barbarians, and which still
governs in the tribunals of a large portion of the
world.
Ages rolled on and another body of law of pro
fessional creation-the common law-was growing
to be of such an enduring character that it now
rules another large part of the earth. The pro
fession there sought to provide for legal education
by Readers at the Inns, who were taken from the
number of eminent lawyers.
But that system
no
means
for
liberalizing
the understand
provided
of
those
teachers
of
the
law,
and
the method,
ing
poor as it was, perished in the days of Cromwell.
The lack of competent instruction was continued
into times within our memories. Nor till then can
it be said that scientific legal training began, in the
sense that such training is given in the natural and
physical sciences.
But improvement in methods of instruction is
only a part of what we need. Important as is the
science of jurisprudence, widely and deeply as it
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reaches to all points of human life in society, there
is yet not one of the social sciences that has been
less regarded as a field for research. There has
been nothing but superficial research into the
processes by which law comes into being or into the
processes by which the evolution and progress of
society have been aided or hampered by the pro
visions of positive existing law. Not only is there
needed a fund of scientific knowledge by which the
inertia, the conservatism of legal institutions may
be wisely directed, so that legal institutions may
not be a bulwark against the true progress of
humanity, not only is there needed the collection of
the vast materials at hand for improvement of the
practical application and administration of the law
in procedure, in practice, and in adequate tribunals,
but even more is there required the scientific exposi
tion and classification of those failures in the
enacted law, which are strewn on every page of
human history. It has been said that no man was
ever wise enough to draw a statute. Certain it is
that wherever the power and function of creating
law by enactment has existed, it will be found that
every body of men to whom that power has been
confided, however incompetent and ignorant may
have been its composition, has always assumed its
own perfect ability for wise and skillful legislation.
There is a peculiar propriety in the prayer for
Heavenly guidance that begins each day of legisla
tion, but there is a melancholy monotony in the
certainty that Heavenly guidance will be withheld.
Perhaps it is true that such aid is vouchsafed in
legislation as in other things, only to those who aid
themselves, and that a great legal endowment with
a large personnel and apparatus for research, and
the collection and classification of human errors
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and failures in legislation may lead us on to a better
age of lawmaking endeavor. To this result the
practical lawyer must contribute his part by
becoming a jurist worthy of membership in the
order of Ulpian. This can be gained only by a
close association between those to whom law is an
art and those to whom it is a science.
Since I have read the letter of the Founder I
know the vision of things to come that the author
of this endowment has had. It is plain that here
this close association has been provided for in a real
and tangible way. 'Ve can hail this munificent
beginning as a provision for contact between
practitioners and teachers. We can easily visualize
its effects upon the law school, and not less can we
rejoice in its tendency toward liberalizing the pro
fession.
·we may hope that this example may
spread as wide as our whole country.
To one who loves our Sovereign 1\iistress, The
mis, for herself alone, who regards her service not
as a mere means of livelihood but as a consecration
to noble duties, to such a one when, it may be, he is
worn and spent in the toil of the profession or the
struggles of the forum, there will come a retire
ment to this Club. Here in the ease and comfort of
his surroundings, with his soul soothed and bathed
in the beauty of cloister and hall, he will find his
devotion to our Lady of the Law quickened and
renewed. In preparing material for litigation or
legislation, he will find himself associated with men
acquainted with every phase of the literature of the
law; he will find ready to his hand the materials
gathered by research and sifted for his use; he will
find the resources of a great library, the garnered
labors of ages; he may call up the wise and good
of ancient days and dwell in serene communion
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with those who in their day gave themselves wholiy
to the search for truth in the science of the law; and
he can even feel the inspiration of the bright ranks
of those immortals whose wisdom and justice still
guard that eternal throne before which all men do
homage. If he be a spirit touched to fine issues, his
heart will overflow in gratitude to the Founder to
whom he owes these blessings.
In the quaint old ceremony of livery of seisin the
feoffer took the feoffee with him upon the land and
both holding the deed of conveyance the feoffor
handed to the feoffee the hasp or key of the door
and added: "Enter into this house, and God give
you joy." So today we enter this splendid house
with the hope that the blessings of the search for
truth and of labor for the law will give joy to those
who shall in the long time to come enjoy this
benefaction.
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THE LAW SCHOOL AND THE PROFESSIONAL
TRADITION
By RoscoE PouND
Y historians know that Michigan,
Illinois and Wisconsin were once, at
least in legal theory, governed by the
Custom of Paris. That fact has not left
a
upon the actual law of any of those juris
dictions. Nor is the reason far to seek. In the
pioneer days of the French occupation of this part
of North America there was little scope for such
law as is to be found in books. There was need
only for a rude administration of offhand justice in
the simple concerns of a frontier society. And had
there been need for anything more, the chances are
that there was no one in the region who knew
much about what the Custom of Paris was. In like
manner the legal theory is that our forefathers
brought to this country the common law of Eng
land as their inheritance. But let us remember
that it was a long time before the common law of
England, as any actual body of legal precepts, was
in fact a measure of the administration of justice in
what are now the United States.
In colonial
America the administration of justice was chiefly
either ministerial or legislative. It was for the
most part in the hands of magistrates who were
either clergymen or soldiers. Indeed, in the simple
society of colonial America, there was little need for
law as we now understand it. The chief problem
was to keep the peace. There was no complex
social and economic structure requiring an elab
orate legal apparatus as a condition of its existence.
As there was little need for law, there was little
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need for lawyers. Moreover, those who laid the
colonial foundations had a profound distrust of
lawyers. The seventeenth-century era of coloniza
tion coincides with the nadir of the common-law
courts under the Stuarts, and the seventeenth
century lawyers were too often conspicuous as
tools of arbitrary power. The clerical tradition,
born with the rise of the lay advocate and lay
judge at the expense of clerical advocate and
clerical judge in the Middle Ages, revived when
lawyers began to supersede the clergy in the great
offices of state after the Reformation, and strength
ened by Puritan experience of lawyers during the
Commonwealth, reinforced the Puritan disposition
to regard the law as a "dark and knavish business"
and the lawyer as a mischievous parasite.
It is significant that the two American law books
that appeared first, prior to the Revolution, were
treatises on practice before magistrates. Gradually
from the second quarter of the eighteenth century
there come to be lawyer-manned courts and judicial
justice. Just before the Revolution this tendency
was becoming strong.
But the organization of
judicial justice was not complete till well into the
nineteenth century. That century was still to see
legislative new trials, legislative appellate juris
diction, and legislative divorce. Indeed the latter
existed in some places well past the middle of the
century.
In time the commercial and economic develop
ment of the country called for law, and here, as
everywhere else, law and lawyers proved to be
inseparable. In the period immediately after the
Revolution and in the fore part of the nineteenth
century, along with the development of American
law came the development of the American lawyer.
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But while we developed lawyers, we did not develop
a bar in the sense in which the organized profession
is known at common law.
A profession is something that goes back to the
relationally organized society of the Middle Ages,
where the members of a craft, or those who knew
an art or mystery, or those who pursued a common
end, lived a common life. They were brethren,
they lived together, they ate at a common table.
But that idea of a common life, the idea of the
pursuit of a common end by a body of men held
together by some relational bond, was alien to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-the era
when our institutions were formative. That was
an era, not of relational society with ideals of a
common life, but of a highly individualist society
with ideals of a competitive individual life.
In England, as in Europe generally, the lawyers
were and are organized in two branches.
In
England the upper branch, the barristers, consti
tute the bar. They are organized in self-governing
societies that have an immemorial corporate
existence.
The lower branch, the solicitors or
attorneys, were not organized in England until the
nineteenth century. They were merely enrolled in
the courts in which they practised.
In America we made no separation, except for a
brief time theoretically in New Jersey, and we took
for our model the lower branch of the profession.
The American lawyer is "Attorney and Coun
sellor." It is significant that we put "attorney"
first and that statutes sometimes speak of the whole
profession as "practicing attorneys." We took the
attorney or solicitor, not the barrister or counsellor,
for the type of American lawyer. For the whole
genius of the time was opposed to the professional
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idea. In the Jefferson Brick era of our institutions
there were many who regarded anything that set
any man off from his fellow citizens as undemo
cratic. To brand one lawyer as of a lower branch
of the profession, or label another as belonging to a
higher type was deemed un-American.
Indeed
many went further and held that even to segregate
the competent from the incompetent, and to label
the competent as authorized practitioners of the
law was undemocratic and reprehensible.
The
American lawyer, borne on the roll of the court and
admitted to practice therein, subject to discipline
and removal only by the court, is in truth not a
member of the bar in the common-law sense. He is
an attorney or solicitor who is privileged to appear
in court, as the solicitors may appear in the lower
tribunals in England.
But, as Maitland has told us, "taught law is
tough law." Our lawyers were deeply read in the
books of the common law, and in those books they
found the common-law professional ideal.
To
some extent also these ideals had been handed
down from the pre-Revolutionary lawyers, trained
at the Inns of Court, and had been passed on from
generation to generation with the apprentice train
ing of the beginnings of legal education in America.
Moreover, in the days when practice of law was
practice in court, when lawyers regularly went
circuit and met each other day by day in court and
at circuit, certain traditions were able to develop
and to fuse with and give shape to the traditional
ideals of the common-law books and the professional
tradition brought over from England by pre
Revolutionary lawyers and handed down from
lawyer to lawyer in the apprentice training of the
old-time law office. Thus in substance, if not in
·
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form, we did to some degree develop a legal pro
fession, and for the first three quarters of the
nineteenth century we may say in very truth that
there was a bar in each American jurisdiction.
Two circumstances, however, have been operat
ing more and more to break down such professional
tradition and such professional self-control as we
have. First among these is the rise of large cities
and the change from a rural agricultural society to
an urban industrial society. With this change, the
era when the trial lawyer was the type and exemp
lar has passed. The leader of the bar is no longer
the great trial lawyer. Perhaps he is not even the
great advocate before the court in bane.
The
leader today is what one might call, in no depre
ciatory sense, the client caretaker, the pilot of
business, the steward of the leaders of industry.
Lawyers no longer meet each other day by day in
court, much less at circuit. They are no longer
well known each to the other and all to the bench.
On the one hand there is an upper stratum, whose
work is perhaps quite as much business as legal.
At the other extreme there is a lower stratum, little
trained, little sifted, and chiefly engaged in practice
before criminal tribunals.
Thus in the large
American city of today there may be some thou
sands of lawyers but no bar. It is instructive to
compare the profession of law in the great cities of
contemporary America with the lower branch of
the profession in England before the organization
of the Incorporated Law Society. Sampson Brass,
Mr. Vholes, Dodson & Fogg and Caleb Quirk,
Esquire, of Alibi House, well known in England in
the first half of the nineteenth century, have passed
with the organization and incorporation of the
solicitors as a self-governing profession. They are

thoroughly familiar and perfectly easy of identifi
cation in any American city of today.
Another circumstance which has tended to break
down such professional solidarity as we had been
able to develop, is the disappearance of that hand
ing down of professional traditions from lawyer to
lawyer which was involved in and was the good side
of the old apprentice training. Even when I came
to the bar, in 1890, the majority of lawyers were
office trained. But a generation ago office study
was becoming impossible, and it has all but dis
appeared as real study under a preceptor. The
good features of the change are patent. Every
circumstance of the administration of justice in the
complex urban industrial society of present-day
America calls for a deeper and wider training of
lawyers than the training in rules of thumb and in
procedure which was afforded by the law office.
But needed as it was, the change from an appren
tice-trained profession to a school-trained pro
fession has tended to leave the beginner in practice
of law to his general moral sense and his knowledge
of the doctrines of equity as to fiduciaries and has
made for breaking off the tradition that had grown
up and has been handed down in the old-time law
office and at circuit. Moreover, it has been having
this effect at the very time when the tradition was
most needed because the bar had become unwieldy,
without cohesion, and without the effective check
of professional opinion brought to bear on each
lawyer through every-day contact in court and at
circuit.
We must not overlook the one conspicuous
advantage of the old system of apprentice training,
namely, that the law student in his formative days
came in contact immediately with the leaders of
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the bar. By daily contact he absorbed from them
certain traditions, certain ideals of the things that
are done and are not done by good lawyers, and a
certain feeling as to what was incumbent on him as
a member of the profession. We cannot transmit
these things with like efficacy by any system of
formal instruction. Hence thoughtful teachers of
law, as more and more they see the great majority
of those who are to enter practice coming to law
schools, feel as one of their most serious problems
the problem of how to provide an effective substi
tute for this feature of the old apprentice training.
Let us digress a moment to see how American
legal education in the past has risen to the prob
lems of the past-how it has met and proved equal
to the needs of the administration of justice in
America in the past.
One might say with truth, even if somewhat
paradoxically, that American legal education begins
with Blackstone's professorship at Oxford. The
Vinerian professorship at Oxford was soon imitated
in the United States. Chancellor Wythe at William
and Mary, James Wilson at the College of Phila
delphia (afterwards the University of Pennsyl
vania) , James Kent at Columbia, and Isaac Parker
at Harvard, lectured in chairs founded on the
model of Blackstone's. But their lectures were not
and were not meant to be professional training in
law. They were part of the general education of
gentlemen, not part of the professional education
of lawyers. They were lectures for college students
generally and for the community at large.
Law teaching in this country begins in an
expanded law office; in the expansion of apprentice
training of two or three students in the office of a
general practitioner, into apprentice training of a
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large number of students in an office in which the
general law business has disappeared, or at least
has fallen to a minimum, and the work of a pre
ceptor alone remains. Such was the first American
law school, the famous school of Judge Reeve at
Litchfield, Connecticut.
In 1817, Isaac Parker, Chief Justice of Massa
chusetts and Royall Professor at Harvard, with
characteristic Yankee sense, saw that it was waste
ful to have a professor of law lecturing to students
in the college and in addition this expanded law
office teaching them law after graduation. Not
unnaturally he thought of combining the lectures
on law for college students and for the learned com
munity generally with the type of law school
developed by Judge Reeve. Thus in 1817 we got
the first university school of law in the English
speaking world, the Harvard Law School. But at
that time it was not a law school in any modern
sense. From 1817 to 18�5 it was simply a glorified
law office under the eaves of a university. Note
the law book that came from that school. Its first
fruits were a "Treatise on Real Actions." For the
problem of legal education at that time was simple.
It was no more than to provide competent practi
tioners in the courts; to provide men who knew the
art of the craft and were competent to take causes
through the courts. This need was met chiefly by
apprentice training in law offices.
There was
nothing, as yet, which the law school could do
better than the law office. What the law school
could do to meet the needs of this period was done
quickly enough.
A new need soon became manifest and led to a
new era in American legal education. As a general
proposition it may be said that we received seven-

teenth-century English law. At the beginning of
the eighteenth century colonial legislation was
going its own way. By that time, also, political
institutions in the colonies had become fixed.
Colonial lawyers began to appear in the fore part
of the eighteenth century and courts manned by
lawyers were set up about the middle of the
century. Such books as they had spoke from the
seventeenth century.
Even Blackstone's Com
mentaries (1765) speak from the end of the seven
teenth rather than from the latter half of the
eighteenth century.
For his account of equity
tells us of the equity which Selden pronounced a
"roguish thing," not of the equity of Lord Hard
wicke, and his accounts of contracts and of com
mercial law are no less backward if we compare
them with the law reports of his time. Thus the
English law which we received was the old English
land law and over-refined procedure. The develop
ment of equity was not complete in England till
Eldon in the nineteenth century, nor was the
reception of the law merchant in England by any
means completed at the Revolution. We had to
go over the mass of English legal materials, deter
mine what was applicable in America and what not,
and reshape both the several precepts and the
whole body of precepts, so as to give us a common
law for the United States, while at the same time
carrying on a parallel development of equity, a
parallel reception of the law merchant, and a
parallel legislative reform movement, alongside of
what was going on in England.
Nathan Dane, in 18�5, had the vision to see
what was needed, and his endowment of the Dane
professorship for Story was a turning point in
American legal education. The resulting treatises,
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representing Story's teaching, met the need for an
American development of equity and of commercial
law on the basis of English law, with the help of
comparative law and of rational philosophical
speculation. Also Story's treatises made it possible
for the successive new commonwealths which arose
in the course of our westward expansion, and set
up legal institutions and began to make their own
local laws and their own versions of the American
common law, to receive and adapt the Anglo
American legal system instead of experimenting
with codes. Such were the conditions to which the
school of Story and Greenleaf, and Parsons and
Washburn responded; and later the great school of
Cooley met the same needs for the rising common
wealths of the West.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century a
new need developed. The need of the time was, as
it were, to digest what had been absorbed in the
period of growth. The need was, for a season, not
to create, but to order and systematize and har
monize; to put system into each several depart
ment of law, making its contents logically con
sistent, and, by subjecting them to analysis, to
develop a dogmatic apparatus of criticism by which
to bring about a condition of logical interdepen
dence in the whole body of legal precepts. Langdell
and his successors in many schools have addressed
themselves to this need, and have met it so
thoroughly that the profession is now ready to
proceed with assurance in a restatement of the law.
Does not this story of the relation of American
legal education to the needs of American law give
ground for confidence that the new needs which
are developing will be met no less effectively by the
law school of today?
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We cannot doubt that another turning point has
been reached. Transition from rural, agricultural
pioneer America to urban, industrial America,
calls once more for creative juristic effort. New
and serious needs are manifest, of which the recon
struction and further development of the pro
fessional tradition is not the least. Let me run
over a few of these hurriedly. Obviously one is the
professionalization of lawyers in our large cities.
Another is overhauling of the criminal law, con
spicuously the weakest point in our American
policy. Another is improvement of legislation, of
which Mr. Zane has spoken so well already. Yet
another is enforcement of law, a sore point every
where in America at this moment. Again there is
the need of a better adjustment between law and
administration, made acute in recent years by the
rapid rise and development of executive justice
through boards and commissions.
And beyond
these are the need of individualizing the applica
tion of legal precepts and the administration of
justice so as to give the largest scope for the indi
vidual life under the conditions of an urban society,
and the need of developing preventive justice. For
all these things we must rely chiefly upon our law
schools. In characteristic Anglo-American fashion
we are seeking to meet the newly pressing needs,
not by bureaus and boards, and commissions and
ministries of justice and comprehensive abstract
legislation, but by leaving them to individual
research and individual inventive resource on the
part of those who have been made conscious of
them in their daily work. No one, as I see it, but
the law teacher, who is working in the required
conditions of permanence and independence, may
insure a thoroughgoing unbiassed study and hence
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an enduring scientific solution of the problems of
American administration of justice today.
And so my vision of what shall be achieved under
the auspices of this magnificent foundation goes
even further than the prophetic vision of Dean
Hall. I see not merely a restatement of American
law-a scientific exposition of the body of legal
precepts as they are. I see research going forward
here that shall give us a better criminal law and a
more thorough administration of criminal justice; a
better understanding of how law is to be enforced,
and of what may be enforced and what cannot
be; a better understanding of the principles of
legislation; a better understanding of the relations
of law and administration; a thoroughgoing under
standing of the possibilities of individualizing legal
precepts in action; and a development of preventive
justice that shall do for the administration of
justice what preventive medicine has been doing
for the public health.
Three problems immediately confront the Amer
ican law school. One is to keep up the old-time
effective teaching of law, as a teaching for common
law lawyers, in view of the enormous growth in
bulk of legal materials, the bewildering growth of
local law, the development of new departments of
social control through the law, and, not least, the
continually increasing numbers which now crowd
our schools. A second is to do the work of research
which is urgently required by the condition of the
administration of justice in America today. This
work can be done only with the aid of endowment.
And I undertake to say that with endowment
American law schools can do for the administration
of justice quite as much as the medical schools have
been able to do in their province through the
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generous endowments which have been lavished
upon them. The third problem is to provide some
substitute for the old-time contact of the student
with the leaders of the profession and the handing
down of the traditional ideals and professional
ethics of the bar, which were the best features of
the apprentice training of the beginnings of
American law.
As to the first, I think we may flatter ourselves
that we are learning how to do it. As to the second,
graduate instruction in law, in which you are
making a notable beginning at Michigan, seems to
point the way. This foundation will be fruitful in
stimulating the work of legal research throughout
the land. It will set an example to other donors of
the possibility of achieving great things for the
administration of justice in this country by intelli
gently bestowed bounty.
But most of all what I look for from this founda
tion is a solution of our third problem, and through
that a means of reconstructing the professional
tradition, and professionalizing the lawyers of our
great cities. This seems to be involved in Mr.
Cook's very idea of a Lawyer's Club. Here there is
to be a bringing together of law students, and
practitioners, and judges, and jurists in one institu
tion, with a certain measure of common life,
making the student conscious in his student days
that he is a member of a profession. Here may
well be restored the element in legal education
which seemed to be lost with the passing of the
apprentice training of the lawyer. We have bar
associations, we have codes of legal ethics, we have
projects for incorporating the profession. They
are all good. I believe in them heartily. But the
bar association and the code of ethics come after
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the student has ceased to be formative. They do
not enter vitally into the formation of the lawyer.
And the projects for incorporating the bar, as I see
it, will fail of achieving what we hope for them,
unless there goes with them contact of students
with the leaders of the profession in the students'
formative years, bringing home to them subtly
but thoroughly that they are members of a pro
fession.
For such reasons I believe that Mr. Cook's
foundation is destined to mark a turning point in
the history of American legal education and there
fore of American law. May it prove as fruitful as
Blackstone's professorship at Oxford, as Kent's
lectures at Columbia, as Story's professorship at
Harvard.
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